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Abstract  
While international law has typically waxed and waned in feminist favours, 
contemporary feminist engagements reveal a strongly critical, reflective thrust about the 
costs of engaging international law and the quality of ostensible gains. To inform this 
reflection, the article draws on feminist scholarship in international law – and a specific 
feminist campaign for the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security in Northern Ireland – to distill three distinct 
feminist understandings of international law that underpin both theory and advocacy. 
Firstly, international law is understood as a system of rules to which states are bound; 
secondly, as an avenue for the articulation of shared feminist values; and thirdly, as a 
political tool to advance feminist demands. The study finds that feminist doctrinalists, 
and those working within the institutions of international law, share concerns about the 
resolution’s legal deficiencies and the broader place of the Security Council within 
international lawmaking. These concerns are, however, largely remote for local feminist 
activists, who recognized in the resolution important political resources to support their 
mobilization, their alliances with others and ultimately, it is hoped, their engagement with 
state actors. The article concludes that critical reflection on feminist strategy in 
international law is usefully informed by more deliberate consideration of its legal, 
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political and normative dimensions, as well as an awareness that these dimensions will be 
differently weighted by differently situated feminist actors. 
 
1. Introduction 
These are difficult times for feminist internationalists. International law-making is 
proliferating in respect of women’s human rights,1 women’s participation rights,2 and in 
ending impunity for particular forms of gender-based violence. 3  Yet, contemporary 
developments suggest not only ongoing work in the generation of international law 
norms, 4  but also concerted activity to reflect on and evaluate the efficacy of these 
international legal developments. Findings from the UN’s recent Global Study on 
Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)5 (hereafter Resolution 1325) will likely feed 
into broader concerns about the efficacy of feminist strategy in international law (what 
Bell has called ‘the era of disillusionment’).6 While international law has typically waxed 
and waned in feminist favours, contemporary feminist engagements reveal a strongly 
                                                 
1  United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 
'General Recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-
conflict situations', CEDAW/C/GC/30 (2014). 
2 SC Res. 1325 1325 (2000); SC Res. 2122 (2014). 
3 International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual Violence in 
Conflict, 11 June 2014, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-protocol-on-the-
documentation-and-investigation-of-sexual-violence-in-conflict (last visited 31 August 
2016).  
4 For example, SC Res. 2144 (2015). 
5 UN Women, ‘Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global 
Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325’, 9 
October 2015. 
6  Bell, 'What We Talk About When We Talk About Political Settlements: Towards 
Inclusive and Open Political Settlements in an Era of Disillusionment', 1 Political 
Settlements Working Papers 1, at 9.  
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critical, reflective thrust about the costs of engaging international law and the quality of 
ostensible gains.7  
The article sets out to make two distinct contributions to contemporary critical 
feminist reflection about feminist strategy in international law. Firstly, the article offers a 
novel heuristic device, that distinguishes between international law as a system of rules to 
which states are bound, as an avenue for the articulation of shared feminist values, and as 
a political tool to advance feminist demands. Much evaluation of international law for 
gender equality focuses, for example, on treaty ratification, the extent of state compliance 
or non-compliance with relevant instruments, 8  and the quality of implementation by 
intergovernmental organizations.9 Evidence points to energy by women’s organizations 
in local and transnational settings,10 and to feminists within international institutions,11 
continuing to work proactively for the development and enforcement of such norms. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the pursuit of legal obligation and state compliance is but one 
important motivation for feminist engagement. The article seeks to elucidate these other 
normative and political considerations.  
Secondly, the article contributes new empirical data from research conducted 
across local, transnational and ‘insider’ levels of feminist engagement with international 
                                                 
7  See, for example, Otto, 'The Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on Gender Issues in 
International Law over the Last Decade,' 10 Melbourne Journal of International Law 
(2009) 11. 
8 Charlesworth, 'Transforming the United Men's Club: Feminist Futures for the United 
Nations' 421 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems (1994) 421. 
9   Charlesworth and M. Woods, '’Mainstreaming Gender’ in International Peace and 
Security: The Case of East Timor' 26 Yale Journal of International Law (2001) 313. 
10 J.M. Joachim, Agenda Setting, the UN, and NGOs: Gender Violence and Reproductive 
Rights (2007). 
11 S. Sharat, Gender, Shame and Sexual Violence: The Voices of Witnesses and Court 
Members at War Crimes Tribunals (2011). 
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law,12 in order to provide insights on feminist strategy from activists. Critical scholarly 
reflection focused on the activities of the UN system and state parties may overlook what 
these international law norms for gender equality mean to the feminist activists who 
engage them. As Hilary Charlesworth argues, in her reflection on feminist scholarship in 
international law, ‘the challenge is to define practical and responsive methods to support 
feminist political projects’.13 Likewise, as the Global Study on Resolution 1325 cautions: 
‘The great changes we are undergoing must primarily be understood in the context of the 
needs and concerns of women in specific situations of conflict. The “local” must clearly 
be the most important factor in our analysis.’14 Through a situated focus on multi-level 
feminist advocacy for the implementation of the Resolution 1325 in Northern Ireland, the 
study draws on insights from local feminist advocacy, transnational feminist 
organizations and from feminists within the institutions of international law.  
The article begins by addressing some immediate definitional issues, addressing 
in turn the understanding of ‘strategy’, ‘feminist’, and ‘international law’ that underpin 
the article, and introduces the article’s case study of multi-level feminist advocacy for the 
implementation of Resolution 1325 in Northern Ireland (Part Two). Part 3 draws on 
feminist scholarship and advocacy to identify the key legal doctrinal challenges posed by 
international law to achieving feminist objectives, and responses to those challenges. Part 
4 identifies the unique potential, and risks, of international law as a vehicle for the 
articulation of shared feminist values. Part 5 considers the particular opportunities and 
risks posed by international law as a political tool to advance feminist demands. 
Significantly, the article finds, feminist doctrinalists, and those working within the 
institutions of international law, share concerns about the resolution’s legal deficiencies 
and the broader place of the Security Council within international lawmaking. These 
                                                 
12 These levels of advocacy are defined and explained further infra notes 37-38 and 
accompanying text. 
13 Charlesworth, 'Talking to Ourselves? Feminist Scholarship in International Law' in S. 
Kouvo and Z. Pearson (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Contemporary International Law 
(2011) at 32.  
14 UN Women, supra note 5, at 17.  
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concerns appear, however, largely remote and distant for local feminist activists and non-
legal scholars, who recognize in the resolution important political resources to support 
feminist mobilization, alliances with others and in their engagement with certain state 
actors. Thus, the article concludes, critical scholarly reflection on feminist strategy in 
international law is usefully informed by more deliberate consideration of its legal, 
political and normative dimensions, as well as an awareness that these dimensions will be 
differently weighted by differently-situated feminist actors. 
 
2. Feminist Strategy in International Law: Initial Definitions 
A. ‘Strategy’ 
The felt urgency of action, and indeed the crisis tendency of international law,15 means 
that many feminist engagements might only infrequently be regarded as a matter of pre-
determined ‘strategy’. More commonly, they manifest as reactive matters of necessity. 
According to Mintzberg’s influential conceptual treatment of ‘strategy’, two essential 
elements are involved, namely ‘[strategies] are made in advance of the actions to which 
they apply, and they are developed consciously and purposefully’.16 Dissonance between 
this definition and the diverse, disaggregated, and often crisis-led, nature of feminist 
engagements with international law is clear. Nevertheless, longer-term campaigns for, for 
example, the adoption of new international treaties or soft law documents,17 suggest time 
and space and energy for reflection, assessment, calculation and deliberate strategizing. 
Even more overtly reactive measures, such as urgent statements requesting international 
                                                 
15  Charlesworth, 'International Law: A Discipline of Crisis' 65 Modern Law Review 
(2002) 377.  
16 Mintzberg, ‘The Strategy Concept’ 30 California Management Review (1987) 11.  
17 For example, the pursuit of individual complaints mechanism for the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, see further de Albuquerque, 
'Chronicle of an Announced Birth: The Coming into Life of the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—the Missing Piece of 
the International Bill of Human Rights' 32 Human Rights Quarterly (2010) 144. 
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action to respond to crisis, 18  point to ‘strategy as pattern’. 19  This is a definition of 
strategy, not just as plan, but that captures resulting behavior: ‘strategy is consistency in 
behavior, whether or not intended’.20 Consistency in feminist engagement underpins the 
claim to the existence of a broad feminist strategy in international law, even if that 
strategy goes largely unarticulated. 
B. International Law 
Given the broad scope of public international law, some specificity of regime is 
appropriate for this discussion. Questions of feminist strategy in international law have 
arguably reached their nadir with Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security 
(WPS). More than any other feminist-informed development in international law, the 
resolution has prompted the most vocal and critical concerns about the cooption of the 
women’s movement and the de-radicalization of feminist engagement with international 
law, with little material gain secured from this engagement.  
The prominence of the resolution within critical reflections on feminist strategy 
can be attributed to six linked grounds, which are elaborated more fully in the remainder 
of the article. Firstly, the resolution emerges from the UN Security Council, typically the 
institution that is regarded as the most militarist and nakedly driven by global power 
politics of all UN institutions. Secondly, the resolution focuses on the participation of 
women as a panacea in international peace and security, with insufficient focus on the 
transformation of existing modes of international peace- and security-making 21  (the 
absence of any reference to disarmament in the resolution is identified as the classic 
representation of the resolution’s failure to challenge militarism). Thirdly, the 
                                                 
18 For example, the letter from a Coalition of 71 Congolese NGOs, Representing the 
Women of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to the UN Security Council, 
Congolese Women Appeal to the UN Security Council to End Sexual Violence, 12 June 
2008.  
19 Mintzberg, supra note 16. 
20 Ibid. 
21 See, for example, C. Cockburn, From Where We Stand: War, Women’s Activism and 
Feminist Analysis (2007). 
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resolution’s shadowy legal status, given that it was not adopted under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, linked to, fourthly, the weak enforcement mechanisms attached to the 
resolution. Fifthly, the displacement of gender equality claims from the system of state 
ratification and systematic treaty monitoring undertaken by the Committee on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 22  And finally, the 
vulnerability of the resolution to the significant narrowing of the WPS agenda in 
subsequent resolutions to an almost exclusive focus on conflict-related sexual violence.23 
While many of these identified feminist concerns are not unique to Resolution 1325, they 
are most pronounced in respect of Resolution 1325.  
C. ‘Feminist’ 
The designation ‘feminist’ involves inherent diversity. Even feminists unified by 
engagement with international law will differ along other important political and 
theoretical axes. Arguably, the focus on feminists who engage international law pre-
determines a particular type of ‘liberal’ or ‘reformist’ feminism,24 though there is little 
empirical evidence to suggest that this is the case. Contemporary feminist scholarship or 
engagement with international law seldom frames disagreement as a matter of feminist 
ideology. Indeed, in feminist theorizing more broadly, we have largely witnessed the 
decline of old certainties and divisions between feminist schools of Marxism/socialism, 
liberalism and radicalism. 25  In practice, identifying feminist engagement with 
                                                 
22  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
adopted and opened for signature by General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 
December 1979, 1249 UNTS 1, Article 17. 
23 See especially Otto, supra note 7. 
24 R. Jahan, The Elusive Agenda: Mainstreaming Women in Development (1995).  
25 See, for example, M. Zalewski, Feminism After Postmodernism? Theorising through 
Practice (2003), quoting Gatens (1992) at 120: ‘Over the last two decades, the 
diversification of feminist theories has rendered the rather convenient tripartite division 
into Marxist [socialist] feminism, liberal feminism and radical feminism virtually 
useless’.  
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international law is less problematic empirically than theoretically and an approach that 
combines inductive and deductive methods is appropriate.26 
To illustrate, feminist advocacy for the implementation of the Resolution 1325 in 
Northern Ireland has involved local feminist mobilization to make international law 
matter on the ground in states. 27  Such advocacy has emerged both from large 
organizations operating across the jurisdiction, such as the Women’s Resource and 
Development Agency, and smaller more localized organizations, such as the North 
Belfast Women’s Forum and the Rural Women’s Network.28 In addition, support for 
campaigns within Northern Ireland has been leveraged from feminists working at the 
transnational level, such as the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom 
(WILPF) and the London-based network of international women’s NGOs, Gender Action 
on Peace and Security (GAPS).29 Finally, insider advocacy by feminists working within 
the institutions of international law, has also taken place in the pursuit of Resolution 1325 
implementation in Northern Ireland, most notably by the CEDAW Committee.  
Across levels of local, transnational and insider activism, therefore, we see a 
broad strategy of engagement with international law that can be identified as feminist, 
although there is considerable difference of emphasis across this engagement. In 
particular, as the article elucidates, while insider feminists give extensive attention to the 
legal status of international gender equality norms, local feminist activists consider such 
                                                 
26 See, for example, Chinkin, 'Feminist Interventions into International Law' 19 Adelaide 
Law Review (1997) 13, which maps key feminist interventions without offering a 
definition. See also N. Reilly, Women’s Human Rights (2008).  
27 S.E. Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into 
Local Justice (2006). 
28 See, for example, Women’s Resource and Development Agency, ‘Women and Peace 
Building’, available at http://www.wrda.net/Women-and-Peace-Building.aspx (last 
visited 1 September 2016).  
29 Gender Action for Peace and Security, available at http://gaps-uk.org/ (last accessed 1 
September 2016). 
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norms almost entirely in terms of their efficacy in supporting feminist mobilization, 
underpinning local alliances and (potentially) influencing local policy actors.   
D. Situating Feminist Strategy in International Law: The Case of Northern Ireland 
Northern Ireland offers a salutary case study about ‘the long grass’ of peacemaking for 
women.30  Whereas the peace talks were marked by a degree of relative openness, 31 
subsequent years of crisis-led political developments in the implementation of the 1998 
Belfast/Good Friday Agreement signaled a significant narrowing of the political space 
afforded to women and to civil society more broadly. Numbers of women in the 
Legislative Assembly established by the Agreement remain low, at less than 20%. The 
number of women in public appointments has actually fallen since the Agreement was 
signed.32 Beyond the descriptive representation of women, substantive gender issues such 
as childcare and the rights of sexual minorities have received scant political priority.33 
There is significant evidence of a ‘rollback’ on human rights protections in the 
jurisdiction, 34 and women’s security more broadly. In particular, local community-based 
consultation with women and women’s groups tells a consistent story of political 
                                                 
30 Rooney and Swaine, ‘The Long Grass of Agreements: Promise, Theory and Practice’ 
12 International Criminal Law Review (2012) 519. 
31 See, for example, K. Fearon, Women's Work: The Story of the Women's Coalition 
(1999); Christine Bell, 'Women and the Problems of Peace Agreements: Strategies for 
Change' in Radhika Coomaraswamy and Dilrukshi Fonseka (eds), Peace Work: Women, 
Armed Conflict and Negotiation (Peace Work: Women, Armed Conflict and Negotiation, 
Women Unlimited 2005). 
32 Assembly and Executive Review Committee, Report on Women in Politics and the 
Northern Ireland Assembly (2015).  
33 See generally Northern Ireland Women's European Platform, Shadow Report submitted 
for the Examination of the Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland at the 55th 
Session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (2013) 
34 Committee on the Administration of Justice, Mapping the Rollback: Human Rights 
Provisions of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 15 Years On (2013). 
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marginalization, active silencing from residual paramilitary influence, and displacement 
from paid community development positions.35    
What has been fascinating about the response of women’s organizations (locally 
termed ‘the women’s sector’) to this political marginalization is the prominence of 
Resolution 1325 to these efforts. This advocacy has taken place in the context of 
persistent resistance from the United Kingdom (UK) to the resolution’s application to 
Northern Ireland, based on long-running unwillingness of the UK government to 
acknowledge that it was engaged in a conflict within its borders. Indeed, the grander 
backdrop to contemporary campaigns for application of the resolution to Northern Ireland 
is the British government’s evasion of effective scrutiny of its activities in Northern 
Ireland by the international legal system.36 An important question then as to the efficacy 
of the resolution, is the extent to which the Resolution has purchase in the context of the 
entrenched resistance of a major Western state – one of the Security Council’s five 
permanent members and pen-holder for the WPS resolutions – to its application. This 
relatively stark case has the potential to elucidate broader theoretical issues about the 
operation of international law, state and intergovernmental activity, and feminist 
engagement.  
Empirical case study research for the article involved detailed documentary 
review across relevant feminist publications from local feminist advocacy for domestic 
implementation of Resolution 1325, transnational feminist advocacy for normative 
development and enforcement, and insider levels of advocacy.37 The documentary review 
                                                 
35 McWilliams and Kilmurray, 'From the Global to the Local: Grounding UNSCR 1325 
on Women, Peace and Security in Post Conflict Policy Making' 51 Women's Studies 
International Forum (2015) 128. 
36  See further, Campbell, ''Wars on Terror' and Vicarious Hegemons: The UK, 
International Law, and the Northern Ireland Conflict' 54 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly (2005) 321.  
37 Relevant scholarship more commonly examines and theorizes ‘gender experts’, defined 
as technocrats within the systems of international governance who either bring their 
gender studies background to technical intergovernmental work, or enhance their 
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was combined with a small number of interviews (fifteen), conducted evenly across local, 
transnational and insider levels, to ascertain feminist activist views on advocacy for 
implementation of the resolution in Northern Ireland.38 Interviews with insider activists 
have been kept confidential, due to the respondents’ continued positions within the 
international system. These ‘insiders’ had experience across UN field offices and various 
                                                                                                                                                 
technical expertise by learning gender skills.  Feminist ‘insiders’ is preferred in analysis 
here because it captures feminist advocacy in the multilateral system beyond technocratic 
expertise, such as the deliberate movement into key political spaces within the 
multilateral system in order to advance a feminist agenda.  There are multiple country 
sites and levels, therefore, from which to consider feminist strategy in international law, 
in particular in the messy business of peacebuilding. Although under-studied and 
inadequately theorized in the TANs scholarship and, indeed, in broader feminist 
scholarship in international law, understanding of feminist ‘insiders’ can be usefully 
advanced through the (largely Australian) scholarship on ‘femocrats’, or feminist 
bureaucrats, see further Sawer, 'Waltzing Matilda: Gender and Australian Political 
Institutions' in G. Brennan and F.G. Castles (eds), Australia Reshaped: 200 Years of 
Institutional Transformation (2002). There are reasons to believe that this constituency of 
feminist ‘insiders’ in international law is undergoing a growth spurt. Intergovernmental 
organizations, in particular the UN, evidence growing institutionalization of feminist 
agendas, such as through the constitution of the UN Women in 2010. Further, there is 
growing evidence of women, feminists and lawyers with women’s rights experience 
advancing in international courts, such as the appointment of Fatou Bensouda as Chief 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. See further Prügl, 'Gender expertise as 
feminist strategy' in G. Caglar and others (eds), Feminist Strategies in International 
Governance (2013). 
38 The typology offered here of local, transnational and insider feminist engagement with 
international law draws on, though departs in significant ways from, the paradigmatic 
work concerning ‘transnational advocacy networks’, or TANs, developed by M. E. Keck 
and K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics 
(1998).  
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UN agencies based in Geneva and New York and across thematic work areas of gender, 
human rights, development and peacebuilding. All other respondents are named. The 
author concedes that this is a very modest evidence base and does not seek, therefore, to 
make overly-broad conclusions. Rather, the key objective is to illustrate broad lines 
worthy of further inquiry. Moreover, interviewing individuals who are allies, even 
friends, about advocacy that I had, in particular at the local level, collaborated with them 
to advance presents obvious issues of researcher effect. These limitations are 
acknowledged. 
 
3. International Law as Law: The Pursuit of Legal Obligation and State Compliance 
There is active debate amongst feminist internationalists about what international law 
stands for.39 Some read international law principally as a set of rules to which states 
commit and with which states must comply. At last, it seems, after decades of neglect, 
there is a clear body of treaty law, jurisprudence, Security Council resolutions and soft 
law for a principle that women’s rights and equality must be protected by states, 
including in the specific context of armed conflict. It points to a way around the problems 
of recalcitrant or regressive states. The enforcement of such rules may not, however, be 
unproblematic. This section draws on feminist scholarship and advocacy to identify the 
key legal doctrinal challenges posed by international law to achieving feminist objectives, 
and feminist responses to those challenges. 
A. The ‘Compliance Paradox’ of Soft Law 
An initial problem for feminist doctrinalists, or formalists, is that the advancement of the 
official recognition of women’s equality and human rights is disproportionately contained 
within proliferating soft law documents. Thus, feminist doctrinal critique displays a 
preoccupation with the sources of international law and the relative basis of gender 
equality and women’s rights norms therein. The areas that lack clarity in the sources of 
international law are legion and Boyle and Chinkin argue that the International Court of 
                                                 
39  On feminist internationalism and international law, see generally Charlesworth, 
'Martha Nussbaum's Feminist Internationalism' 1111 Ethics (2000) 64.  
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Justice statute’s articulation of sources 40  is ‘dated and increasingly misleading’. 41 
Importantly in terms of feminist engagement, they identify the proliferation of soft law as 
challenging the clarity of article 38’s neat typology of sources. This analysis troublingly 
locates women’s rights and equality under shadowy legal protection.  
Soft law instruments can offer some advantages to feminist advocates. They are 
generally more susceptible to feminist participation in their formulation. Formalists 
therefore acknowledge the efficacy of soft law as democratizing the making of 
international law.42 Further, it is often easier for drafters to adopt specific and precise 
terms in non-binding international agreements.43 Soft law instruments can ‘produce legal 
effect’, as they influence the interpretation of legally-binding commitments. The 
interpretative power of soft law is particularly valuable against the backdrop of weak 
enforcement attached to the CEDAW Convention.44 Soft law can provide an entry-way 
for women into international law-making when formal sites have been so exclusionary.  
Soft law clearly also can pose threat to feminists. Formalists are concerned about 
what Charlesworth has called a ‘compliance paradox’ that has emerged with the 
diversification of sites and agents of international law-making. She noted in 1998 that the 
gender equality norms emerging from international conferences were weak. 45 Moreover, 
their greater distance from state consent has a resultant impact on the likelihood of state 
compliance.46 The ‘compliance paradox’ therefore emerges that, while NGOs (including 
feminists) have greater involvement in the development of norms, the legal status – and 
thus compliance pull – of these norms on states is markedly weaker.  
                                                 
40 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 33 UNTS 993, Article 38(1). 
41 A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law (2007) at 211. 
42 See, for example, Charlesworth, 'The Unbearable Lightness of Customary International 
Law' 92 American Society of International Law Proceedings (1998) 44. 
43 Ibid., at 192.  
44 Charlesworth and Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis 
(2000) at 104.  
45 Charlesworth, supra note 42.  
46 Ibid.  
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It seems hard not to conclude, therefore, that the UN Security Council has offered 
the allure, but not the effect, of robust legal status. It bears reflection that a number of the 
progressive articulations of gender equality in international law have taken place in the 
blurred area between binding and non-binding instruments. The desire for clear legally-
binding obligations on states was a key motivation for transnational and insider activists 
moving feminist demands from the international human rights system and UN General 
Assembly to the UN Security Council. 47  Yet, while the UN Charter mandates UN 
member states to ‘accept and carry out’ decisions of the Security Council, 48  it is 
resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (International Peace and 
Security) that are binding in nature.49 Resolution 1325 is a ‘thematic’ and nonbinding 
resolution best understood as adopted under Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) 
of the UN Charter.50 The resolution’s legal authority has been accentuated by the fact that 
it was passed unanimously, and that the resolution uses the language of obligation in 
parts. 51  The question persists, nevertheless, as to the wisdom of investing feminist 
energies in legal strategies that do not give rise to clearly legally-binding obligations.52  
                                                 
47 Cockburn, supra note 21, at 132-155 
48 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Article 
25 (hereafter UN Charter). 
49 See, for example, ‘Extending the Mandate of the UN Operation in Iraq: Options’, 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg43716/pdf/CHRG-
110hhrg43716.pdf  (last accessed 1 September 2016). 
50 See generally Szasz, 'The Security Council Starts Legislating' 96 American Journal of 
International Law (2002) 901. 
51 On the status and nature of Resolution 1325, see S. Anderlini, Women Building Peace: 
What they do, Why it Matters (2004) at 196–199; Otto, ‘A Sign of “Weakness”? 
Disrupting Gender Certainties in the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 
1325’ 13 Michigan Journal of Gender and Law (2006) 113; Tryggestad, ‘The UN and 
Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and 
Security’ 15 Global Governance (2009) 539.  
52 Otto, supra note 7. 
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B. The Fragmentation of International Law and Gender Equality Norms 
A second problem for feminist formalists is the mooted fragmentation of gender equality 
norms under international law. Critical legal scholars encourage legal reform advocates to 
reflect carefully on just what actors are being empowered by a proposed legal reform.53 
The pursuit of the WPS agenda through the UN Security Council generates analogous 
concerns about the disempowerment of the most democratic and representative UN 
organ, with specific responsibility for disarmament, 54  namely the General Assembly. 
Likewise, it raises questions about disempowering the most effective mechanisms of state 
accountability for gender equality, namely human rights treaty-monitoring bodies. The 
systemic implications of a feminist targeting of the UN Security Council for legal 
progress are writ large here.  
The fragmented location of gender equality norms within an increasingly 
fragmented international legal system should likewise sound a feminist doctrinal alarm 
bell.55 More dispersed gender equality norms are more difficult to enforce, as it is unclear 
what institution has key responsibility for enforcement. 56  There are a plethora of 
specialized agencies, institutions and subsystems involved in the contemporary business 
of generating gender equality norms. One can argue that this is broadly positive in 
reinforcing the norm. Nevertheless, the general trajectory is that such norms are emerging 
from less representative and less democratic forums, which are in turn more vulnerable to 
powerful states and non-state actors.57  Together, these factors can mean the reduced 
coherence and reduced legitimacy of the resulting gender equality norms.58  
                                                 
53 For example, Smart, 'Feminism and Law: Some Problems of Analysis and Strategy' 14 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law (1986) 109. 
54 UN Charter, supra note 48, Article 11(1). 
55 Ní Aoláin, ‘International Law, Gender Regimes and Fragmentation: 1325 and Beyond’ 
in C. M. Bailliet (ed) Non-state actors, soft law and protective regimes: from the margins 
(2012) at 53-68.  
56 Ibid. 
57 Boyle and Chinkin, supra note 41, at 124-5. 
58 Ibid.  
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In order to circumvent their obligations, powerful states may deliberately pursue a 
number of ‘fragmentation strategies’. 59  The coincidence in 2000 of the adoption of 
Resolution 1325 by the UN Security Council and the entry into force of the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) might be read as a high watermark of feminist influence in 
international law. Alternatively, it might be read as the dislocation of feminist energies 
from the treaty-based human rights system, with its established systems of state 
accountability, monitoring and enforcement. Benvenisti and Downs identify four state 
‘fragmentation strategies’ for the avoidance of international obligations:  
1) avoiding broad, integrative agreements in favor of a large number of narrow 
agreements that are functionally defined; (2) formulating agreements in the 
context of onetime or infrequently convened multilateral negotiations; (3) 
avoiding whenever possible the creation of a bureaucracy or judiciary with 
significant, independent policymaking authority and circumscribing such 
authority when its creation is unavoidable; and (4) creating or shifting to an 
alternative venue when the original one becomes too responsive to the interests of 
weaker states and their agents.60  
In light of Benvenisti and Down’s fourth ‘fragmentation strategy’ – the creation 
of alternative venues when the original one becomes too responsive – it bears reflection 
that, unlike the human rights treaty monitoring system, the WPS resolutions operate with 
a considerably more diffuse understanding of accountability, that carries no ‘concrete 
outcomes, commitments [or] review’.61  
C. Confronting State Literalism 
The third limitation – material to some feminist activists, though not universally so –is 
the fraught question of the formal legal status of the gender equality norm being invoked. 
Most notably, the textual and legal limitations of Resolution 1325 defined many of the 
                                                 
59  Benvenisti and Downs, 'The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the 
Fragmentation of International Law' 60 Stanford Law Review (2007) 595 at 600. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ní Aoláin, supra note 55, at 137.  
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daily activities of insider feminists. For example, they were routinely required by member 
states and UN agencies to cite the precise content of the resolution to justify any requests 
or recommendations. Further, insider feminists consistently ran up against the gap 
between the text of the resolution and its actual implementation by UN agencies and 
member states:  
I feel like sometimes we’re stretching it a bit when we talk about that because a 
member state will come back and say “where is that written?” when I talk about 
bigger picture, structural change… You’re sitting with the civil servant who has 
the resolution and his government’s mandate is only what’s written in that 
document.62 
Arguments for mainstreaming the resolution within all UN work prompted state 
responses that the resolutions applied only to countries within the mandate of the Security 
Council, and not to all conflict-affected and post-conflict member states.63 In other cases, 
UN member states that were not members of the Security Council claimed that the 
resolution did not apply to them.64 For insider feminists, the question of the resolution’s 
legal status and interpretation was a daily practical concern.  
Insider concerns about the systemic implications of the Security Council’s 
adoption of the WPS resolutions principally revolved around the perceived risk of 
displacement of the WPS agenda from the Security Council to the General Assembly. 
Their concerns were grounded in its immediate legal implications. For the WPS agenda 
to have any role in Security Council decision-making on matters such as referrals to the 
International Criminal Court, country-specific resolutions, donor conferences for conflict-
affected countries and peace talks, the Security Council WPS resolutions were recognized 
to be critical. The example was offered of the 2013 Security Council debate on Mali and 
the contribution of UN Women’s then Director, Michelle Bachelet, to the formal debate: 
‘Literally, that’s the difference: it gets you in the door.’65 
                                                 
62 Insider #1, Interview with Author, 21 June 2013.  
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
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The formal delineation of roles between the General Assembly and the Security 
Council is to designate the former as ‘encouraging the progressive development of 
international law and its codification’66 and the latter as rule-enforcing. The distinction is 
articulated in the UN Charter and largely attributable to the different membership 
arrangements. The General Assembly includes all UN member states on the basis of 
sovereign equality and, as such, holds sufficient democratic legitimacy to contribute to 
norm development. The membership of the Security Council, by contrast, is highly 
selective and as such is empowered only with a role in enforcing the international law 
that emerges from elsewhere in the international system. Logically, this distinction would 
suggest a privileged position for the General Assembly in feminist activism for the 
progressive articulation of gender rights in international law, and with the ultimate 
objective of codification. In practice, however, insider activists regarded the General 
Assembly the site of ‘just talk’, while ‘the Security Council at least has some kind of 
binding force for the resolutions’.67  
D. CEDAW General Recommendation 30: Bootstrapping Legal Status?  
The CEDAW Committee has staged something of a ‘feminist fightback’ in recent years. 
In 2013, the CEDAW Committee adopted General Recommendation Number 30 on 
women in conflict prevention, conflict and postconflict situations, responding both to 
concerns about the legal status and under-enforcement of Resolution 1325 and indeed to 
the fragmentation of international law norms for gender equality. 68  The General 
Recommendation is inter alia an effort to give retrospective legal status to Resolution 
1325 and its successors. (Notably, the General Recommendation characterizes the 
                                                 
66 UN Charter, supra note 48, Article 13. 
67 Insider #2 [emphasis added], Interview with Author, 6 August 2013. 
68  Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
'General Recommendation No. 30 on Women in Conflict, Prevention, Conflict and Post-
Conflict Situations,' UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/30 (2013); C. O'Rourke and A. Swaine, 
Guidebook on CEDAW General Recommendation No. 30 and the UN Security Council 
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resolutions as ‘crucial political frameworks’. 69 ) It interprets implementation of the 
resolutions as constitutive of state obligations under CEDAW: ‘As all areas of concern 
addressed in those resolutions find expression in the substantive provisions of the 
Convention.’70 
In addition to retrospective legal status, the intervention by the Committee seeks 
to formally bring the domestic implementation of the resolutions under the monitoring 
role of the Committee: 
States parties are to provide information on the implementation of the Security 
 Council agenda on women, peace and security, in particular resolutions 
1325   (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1960 (2010) and 2106 (2013), 
including by  specifically reporting on compliance with any agreed United 
Nations  benchmarks or indicators developed as part of that agenda.71 
The General Recommendation reflects a longer-term body of work by the 
Committee to bring domestic implementation of the resolutions under its purview and 
within the Convention’s formal mechanisms of state accountability. Notably, Northern 
Ireland was the first jurisdiction in which non-implementation of the Resolution 1325 
was raised by the CEDAW Committee. The Committee has maintained attention to the 
issue over the course of the UK’s last two periodic examinations and has robustly 
questioned the UK on its failure to implement the resolution in Northern Ireland.72 In 
                                                 
69 CEDAW, supra note 68, at para 25 [emphasis added]. 
70 Ibid., at para 26. 
71 Ibid., at para 83.  
72  Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
'Summary Record (Partial) of the 1143rd Meeting, Consideration of Reports Submitted 
by States Parties under Article 18 of the Convention (Continued) Seventh Periodic Report 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Continued)’, UN Doc. 
CEDAW/C/SR.1143 (2013), paras 14 and 26; Committee on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 'Summary Record (Partial) of the 844th 
Meeting, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 18 of the 
Convention (Continued) Fifth and Sixth Periodic Reports of the United Kingdom of Great 
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both of the most recent sets of Concluding Observations of the CEDAW Committee to 
the UK, the Committee recommended that Resolution 1325 be implemented in Northern 
Ireland.73 
Insider activity to press for implementation of the resolution in Northern Ireland 
has not been confined to the CEDAW Committee. The communication procedure of the 
Commission on the Status of Women74 has also reportedly been mobilised by activists 
from Northern Ireland, though without any public outcome.75 Moreover, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women raised the specific issue of Resolution 1325 
implementation in Northern Ireland in the country report from her 2014 state visit to the 
UK. 76  In addition, the UN Women Policy Director addressed the Irish Parliament’s 
Foreign Affairs Committee in 2012 discussing, inter alia, implementation and monitoring 
                                                                                                                                                 
Britain and Northern Ireland (Continued)’, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.844 (2008) at para 4 
and 15. 
73  Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
'Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/UK/CO/6' (2009) at para 285, 
calling on the UK to implement Resolution 1325 fully in Northern Ireland; Committee on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 'Concluding 
Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GBR/7' (2013) at para 43. 
74 The communications procedure of the Commission on the Status of Women has its 
roots in Economic and Social Council resolution 76 (V) of 5 August 1947, as amended by 
the Council in resolution 304 I (XI) of 14 and 17 July 1950. Further information is 
available at http://www.unwomen.org/en/csw/communications-
procedure#sthash.MaREzlzM.dpuf (last accessed September 7, 2016). 
75 Insider #1, supra note 62. 
76 Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Rashida Manjoo. Addendum: 
Mission to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/29/27/Add.2 (2015), paras 47 and 107(c)(x).   
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of the Irish National Action Plan, which includes provision to support the resolution’s 
implementation in Northern Ireland.77 The breadth of international institutions pressing 
for implementation of Resolution 1325 in Northern Ireland poses an interesting counter-
point to concerns about fragmentation. In this case, diverse institutions of international 
law are pressing for enforcement of the same norm, despite its unclear legal status.  
The role of the CEDAW Committee – the paradigmatic feminist insiders of the 
international system – also illustrates some important differences amongst feminist 
insiders, depending on their institutional locations. Efforts by the CEDAW Committee to 
advance the WPS agenda are not, therefore, uncontroversial. Some insiders reported that 
efforts to strengthen the connections between WPS and CEDAW had generated 
additional challenges from states that resisted the extra-territorial application of their 
CEDAW obligations to their foreign policy and international activities.78 Alternatively, 
concerns were expressed that the CEDAW Committee activity on state accountability 
distracted from important developments within the UN system and regional organizations 
to influence the foreign policy and international activities of member states. 79  The 
mooted fragmentation of the norm also gives rise to the risk of internal competition for 
resources and political priority.   
CEDAW Committee activity has been uniquely effective in prompting local 
feminist engagement with the legal issues raised by the resolution. The formal admission 
by a UK civil servant to the CEDAW Committee in 2013, that the UK government did 
not view the resolution as applicable because no conflict had taken place in Northern 
Ireland,80 did prompt some more technical local engagement with the language of the 
                                                 
77 Ms Saraswathi Menon, UN Women Policy Director, Joint Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Trade Debate, Dáil Eireann, Wednesday, 24 October 2012, available at 
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resolution and the question of conflict threshold. Local activists appreciated the power of 
the Committee in eliciting a formal response from the UK government on the application 
of the resolution to Northern Ireland.81 The response prompted, in turn, the local umbrella 
organization for women’s groups, the Women’s Resource and Development Agency, to 
commission a study and statement by a local feminist lawyer to the effect that ‘nothing 
within the resolution states that the conflict threshold of the Geneva Conventions must be 
met before the resolution is engaged’. 82  Pursuing a different – and more outcome-
oriented approach – the Equality Commission of Northern Ireland requested information 
on the UK’s intended activities to increase women’s participation in public life in 
Northern Ireland, in lieu of implementing the resolution in Northern Ireland.83 In this 
vein, activists considered it a considerable local success when the Democratic Unionist 
Party acting leader – who continued to contest the legal application of the resolution to 
Northern Ireland – nevertheless conceded the ‘principles that lie behind’ the resolution to 
be worthy of application. 84  On foot of the 2013 CEDAW state hearings, there also 
seemed to be a growing awareness amongst local activists of the potentially greater value 
of CEDAW and the Committee’s General Recommendation Number 30 than that of 
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82 Angela Hegarty, ‘Legal Opinion on the Application of Security Council Resolution 
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Resolution 1325 to their advocacy, due to the UK’s ratification of the instrument and its 
uncontested domestic application.85  
E. Feminist Pragmatism 
A further feminist response to questions about the legal status of the resolution was a 
good degree of pragmatism. For example, activists at transnational level adopted this 
pragmatism despite the avowed motivation of WILPF and other transnational actors in 
targeting the Security Council due its legal authority. Transnational activists responded, 
for example: ‘I tend to highlight what it says and highlight that it’s Security Council’,86 or 
‘People are quick to say it’s not binding because it’s not Chapter VII… but PeaceWomen 
are not worried about legal status: they continue to go ahead and do excellent work’.87 In 
line with local activists, therefore, transnational activists worked hard to ensure that their 
ongoing daily advocacy for women, peace and security was unconstrained by debates 
about legal status. 
Even feminist activists working at the insider level were acutely aware of the 
potential for the question of legal status to act as a ‘distraction’. One insider respondent 
gave the example of an official meeting in Cairo to discuss regional implementation of 
the resolution in North Africa: an hour of the meeting was spent discussing the 
resolution’s legal status, with no agreement reached on the question. The meeting then 
proceeded with the practical business of designing a regional implementation strategy. 
Feminist pragmatism appears, therefore, to be a strategy across levels of activism for 
circumventing – or at least managing – the resolution’s shadowy legal status.  
                                                 
85 For example, Margaret Ward, Women’s Resource and Development Agency, Interview 
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F. Prioritising Local Articulations 
A final response to questions about the resolution’s legal status was relative lack of 
concern about the issue, in particular from local and transnational activists. Local 
feminist activists in Northern Ireland operated with little expectation of strict state 
compliance, nor even necessarily with an understanding of the resolution as ‘law’ per se. 
To illustrate the latter point, there were generally high levels of awareness amongst local 
activists of articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 
its implications for the UK’s approach to conflict-related deaths and injuries. Resolution 
1325 was understood, however, to be qualitatively different from state obligations 
enforced by the European Court of Human Rights and Council of Ministers. As one local 
activists observed: ‘articles 2 and 3 [of the ECHR] are about accountability; while 1325 
feels more about needs’. 88  Some voiced aspirations that the resolution would be 
recognized as a legal obligation by the UK, for example, in requiring the presence of 
women in recent high-level talks on dealing with the past,89 but this was not viewed as 
determinative of the resolution’s utility to local advocacy.   
The resolution’s shadowy legal status arguably offered greater space for local 
feminist interpretation and articulation of the WPS agenda, unconstrained by the formal 
content of the resolution. Local activists felt that it was important that their activities 
under the broad heading of the resolution were not limited by the specific textual content 
of the resolution, much less by its legal status. For example, when asked about the 
significance of the resolutions’ legal implications, one local respondent reported: ‘You 
make texts apply to what you do, don’t you, rather than the other way around?’90 The 
questionable legal status of the resolution was, in these circumstances, viewed with little 
concern. Indeed, a preoccupation with the specific textual and legal content was likely to 
be unhelpful for local advocacy, in adding an undue level of complexity to understanding 
and delivering the women’s demands.  
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The risk that the ‘complexity’ of the resolution countered its efficacy as an 
advocacy tool was articulated several times, both in reaching politicians: ‘You don’t get 
too complicated with the MLAs [Members of the Legislative Assembly].’ 91  And in 
engaging a broad swathe of local women activists in related activism: ‘The language is 
enough to put you off.’92 For example, in explaining the potential value of Security 
Council Resolution 1325 when designing a truth process, one respondent reported:  
But what I’ve also noticed is that it’s quite hard to do.  Do you know, because it 
feels like you have to explain about three different things at once? You know, first 
of all, here’s a UN resolution, and this is what it’s about, secondly, it does have 
relevance to us, and thirdly the British and Irish governments aren’t really 
applying it.  And then maybe even fourthly, why they’re not. And then fifthly, 
why they should.  And then sixth, what you could maybe do with it. So it feels 
like you have to go quite deep in before you can convince people about why it’s 
interesting, and I think that’s something to do with it being a UN resolution.93 
Situating feminist strategy in the specifics of local activism for Resolution 1325 
illustrates the relatively niche nature of many concerns about legal status.  
Feminist sympathies are typically associated with critical suspicion of elite forms 
of knowledge and the construction of expertise. 94  Activist responses are a salutary 
reminder about ‘the danger of valorizing a politics of expertise that [gives] international 
lawyers a privileged position within the debate’.95 Feminist lawyers in domestic settings 
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have long articulated the same concerns, namely ‘the trap of thinking that as feminist 
lawyers we have to be lawyers first and feminists second’.96 The proposition that, if the 
problem is deficient or absent law, the solution is ‘more or “better” law’97 conjures a 
reassuring certainty. Findings here suggest that arguments about legal status risk 
detracting from the real power of the resolution, namely the space it creates for feminists 
to respond to the gendered challenges of conflict, as understood and defined by those 
activists themselves.  
 
4. International Law as Normative: The Articulation of Shared Feminist Values  
Feminist ambitions (and reservations) about Resolution 1325 concern not only the 
resolution’s legal status. The concern of formalists with the legal status of feminist-
informed developments in international law reflects the disciplinary commitments of 
legal scholars. Other disciplinary perspectives, however, also weigh into the debate. For 
example, scholars of International Relations have attended to international law as a set of 
‘standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations,’98 more commonly 
known as norms. Study of the emergence of a ‘global gender equality regime’ identifies 
the existence of explicit rules of gender equality in international treaties, the practice of 
state compliance to those rules, and evidence of a shared understanding amongst states of 
women’s rights as human rights, as conclusive evidence of the existence of a ‘global 
gender equality regime’.99  Tellingly, therefore, this body of scholarship regards the strict 
legal status of such norms as only one of the potential indicators of the existence of such 
a norm. Broadly speaking, feminist scholarship in this vein has been more concerned 
with the gender norms embedded within the resolution and its progeny, than in their strict 
legal status.  
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A. Women as Agents  
Characteristic of celebratory discussion of Resolution 1325 is a focus on the resolution’s 
significance as a set of ‘values’, rather than as law per se. The idea of international law as 
a ‘portmanteau for feminist norms’100 did not start with Resolution 1325, though the idea 
has received particular impetus from the Security Council’s adoption of the resolution. 
Indeed, the normative power of Resolution 1325 was emphasized across the different 
levels of feminist advocacy: the importance of the resolution’s endorsement of women’s 
participation in peacebuilding as important and the Security Council’s imprimatur in that 
respect. To the extent that Security Council Resolution 1325 continues to be celebrated 
for its normative significance, it is for its advancement of women as political agents, and 
not just passive victims, in conflict situations. Insiders note the significance of the 
Security Council talking about women as ‘a big step forward’101 and the importance of 
the language of security, rather than development: ‘the resolution gives a stronger 
framework to that, a stronger rationale, a stronger justification’.102  
For local activists, the resolution offered a ‘good focus and framework’ and 
through its focus on women’s needs and participation, offered a ‘challenge to local 
patriarchy’.103 Also, the resolution was viewed as holding the ‘potential to open up the 
conflict, its nature and people’s experiences’ because of the value of the international 
community setting the agenda. The normative value of the resolution principally lay in 
the potential to shift the local conversation away from a repeated focus on armed actors 
and the political bargaining of military elites, to a broader understanding of conflict, the 
harms it causes and the needs it creates:  
   We live in a very conservative, patriarchal society and trying to maintain a 
strongly feminist stand in everything that we do and to remain true to that, to me 
                                                 
100  Charlesworth, 'International Human Rights Law: A Portmanteau for Feminist 
Norms?,' in G. Caglar, E. Prügl and S. Zwingel (eds), Feminist Strategies in International 
Governance (2013) 21.  
101 Insider #4, Interview with Author, 13 August 2013. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Miskimmon, supra note 81. 
 28 
there isn’t a difficulty in that but when you’re trying to work with people on a 
kind of strategic level who wouldn’t share those kinds of views, it can be really 
helpful to say but out there, on the wider international level, there are important 
organizations who they maybe don’t describe themselves as feminist, as the 
United Nations wouldn’t. But within that, they’ve got an analysis of why it’s 
important that women have equal representation at all levels and what the impact 
would have, and how that would improve society. So being able to maybe put it in 
those terms I think is helpful.104  
International Relations scholarship is typically concerned with the origins of 
norms; the mechanisms by which they diffuse; and finally, the conditions under which 
norms will be influential in world politics.105 Feminists have entered this conversation 
most concertedly in terms of the first question and the role of women’s movements in 
generating new norms of gender equality and women’s (human) rights. Work on 
transnational advocacy networks (TANs) typically identifies the transnational women’s 
movement that targeted the UN as a key site for establishing norms and mobilized for 
formal recognition of women’s rights as human rights as paradigmatic of non-state 
actors, social movements, generating new norms.106 Security Council Resolution 1325 is 
paradigmatic of this activity is repeatedly claimed as ‘owned by the women’s 
movement’.107 
The prominence and perceived success of feminist TANs in this norm generation 
and diffusion has highlighted the importance of ‘soft law’ forums in providing a platform 
for the generation of norms. To illustrate, in terms of norm diffusion, United Nations 
agencies and conferences have been key in the production of an international consensus 
on women’s human rights. Indeed, as Kardam notes: 
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[T]he chronologies of the international women's movement are largely a 
collection of UN meetings: Mexico, Copenhagen, Nairobi, Vienna, Cairo, 
Beijing.108 
Feminist approaches to Security Council Resolution 1325 fit well within this paradigm.  
Analysis of the emergence of the resolution locates its origins within transnational 
civil society activism and the significance of the movement from this informal space to 
the formal institutional level of the UN Security Council in terms of the development and 
diffusion of the norm.109 The genealogy of the resolution lies within the three-prong 
priorities of equality, development and peace inaugurated by the 1975 First World 
Conference on Women in Mexico. These priorities were subsequently reaffirmed at the 
later UN World Conferences on Women.110 Kardam’s work identifies the importance of 
norm leader states – states sympathetic to the emerging norm – in galvanizing 
international institutions to endorse the new norm, and in turn socializing other states into 
accepting the new norm.111 Security Council Resolution 1325 is no exception to these 
dynamics, as Namibia’s centrality to the resolution’s adoption is frequently cited.112 This 
is a powerful example of effective coordination of multi-level feminist activism across 
local, transnational and insider spaces.  
Transnational activists identified the resolution as ‘the heart’ and ‘central to’ their 
work. The WILPF representative described the resolution as ‘the pinnacle of WILPF’s 
work… everything we do is in some way related to the resolution’.113 In particular, the 
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emphasis of resolution on women’s participation and the causes of conflict, was 
celebrated in terms of the resolution’s normative force. This was also reflected in their 
repeated ‘faith’ in the resolution.114 They understood the key benefits of the resolution’s 
application to Northern Ireland as a valuable affirmation of women’s organizations and 
their work in the jurisdiction. They also viewed the key benefit of the inclusion of 
Northern Ireland in these normative terms, that is, were the UK to recognize the domestic 
application of the resolution, it would be an enormous boon to the resolution’s normative 
force, as ‘an immense example to others’.115 
On the whole, there is evidence in the widespread belief in the ‘normative 
transcendence’ of international law during times of domestic strife, which is not unique to 
feminist analysis. 116  Yet, this understanding of international law adopts particular 
resonance where values of women’s participation and inclusion are given expression in a 
manner with little parallel in domestic law.   
B. Ownership and Capture 
Insider feminists were acutely aware of the resolution’s normative significance and the 
potential for the erosion of the normative gains made. Specifically, they were concerned 
about the new resolutions unhelpfully disaggregating a gender equality norm for 
women’s participation in peace and security from the specific issues of conflict-related 
sexual violence. Moreover, they were alert to the dangers of viewing the WPS resolutions 
as principally normative, in particular in light of the flurry of subsequent WPS 
resolutions. Repeated concerns were expressed about the development of new resolutions 
displacing or distracting from the more urgent work of implementation of existing 
resolutions: 
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New resolutions are not bringing anything new to the table: they do not establish 
what is missing in terms of an accountability mechanism… We should not recycle 
the same documents for ourselves just to justify our existence.117 
The early prominence of feminist civil society in norm-generation raises questions 
for contemporary feminist engagement. Does the adoption of Resolution 2242 (2015), led 
by Spain and with little ostensible involvement of feminist civil society, evidence the 
normative transcendence of the WPS agenda? Is the influence of the norm on state 
behavior and world politics such that TAN activism is no longer required? Or does the 
norm itself change as it is internalized by states? Insiders evidenced deep concern over 
the questionable evolution of ownership over the WPS resolutions. Security Council 
Resolution 1325 was viewed as the product and outcome of the women’s movement, and 
belonging to transnational feminist momentum since the UN’s Fourth World Conference 
on Women in Beijing.118 Yet, it was acknowledged, these are resolutely not the factors 
driving the agenda now. Each insider respondent acknowledged the contemporary 
political momentum around the question of conflict-related sexual violence: ‘It’s as if 
every member state has to adopt a WPS resolution when President of the Security 
Council.’119 
Unlike the soft-law developments in women’s rights of the 1990s, in which a 
transnational women’s movement had been the key ‘norm entrepreneur’120 and agent, a 
small number of states are the exclusive power-holders within the Security Council. 
Insider feminists were therefore attuned to the way in which key state actors were re-
privileged at the Security Council: 
So this is the give and take of the system that we have: the opening up and closing 
down of space, that is, how it’s [the resolution] taken on by the system; the 
                                                 
117 Insider #3, supra note 78.  
118 See further Cockburn, supra note 21; Anderlini, supra note 51. 
119 Insider #3, supra note 78.   
120 See generally Kardam, supra note 98; Finnemore and Sikkink, supra note 105; Keck 
and Sikkink supra note 38.  
 32 
technocrats and bureaucrats who decide what to fund get a take on what they 
understand 1325 to be. 
For insiders, it appeared, the political momentum that led to the Resolution and its 
progeny had released material and political resources for some broadly positive activities 
by states and technocrats on women, peace and security. At the same time, the reassertion 
of a state-led international agenda on gender equality systematically narrowed the space 
for political influence of women’s civil society.  
C. The ‘Dark side’ of International Law’s Normative Power 
Critical feminist legal work reveals the darker side of international law’s implicitly 
normative power, in generating ideal types of womanhood (and masculinity). The 
critique is writ large in much contemporary feminist scholarship on Security Council 
Resolution 1325, in particular in work that examines the resolution in the context of its 
successors (Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2122, 2242). Concerns around the 
essentialization of women as passive victims of sexual violence are much more closely 
tied to 1325’s successor resolutions than to Security Council Resolution 1325 itself. The 
‘protective stereotypes of women’ advanced in the resolutions121 manifest as part of the 
larger dynamic identified in critical feminist approaches to international relations, namely 
‘the dark side of the protection racket’.122 Viewed from this perspective, the cost of 
feminist engagement with international law is the privileging of women’s sexual ‘purity’ 
that serves to reinforce, rather than challenge, prevailing restrictive ideals of female 
sexuality.  
The preoccupation with the harm and crime of rape is said to obscure the 
manifold other harms experienced by women in situations of violent conflict, harms that 
cannot be shoehorned into existing legal categories of international criminal law.123 Most 
notable amongst such harms are the acute economic harms posed by war, and the 
                                                 
121 Otto, supra note 7. 
122 Sjoberg and Peet, 'A(Nother) Dark Side of the Protection Racket: Targeting Women in 
Wars,' 13 International Feminist Journal of Politics (2011) 163. 
123 Ní Aoláin and Turner, 'Gender, Truth and Transition' 16 UCLA Women's Law Journal 
(2007) 229, 256. 
 33 
immeasurable harm to familial relationships wrought by the injury or death of a family 
member.124 A further cost sounded in this conceptualization of international law is that 
the emphasis on women’s sexual victimhood reinforces the marginalization of women as 
political actors in societies transitioning from conflict. This focus on women’s sexual 
victimization in turn denies women’s multiple subjectivities in situations of conflict or 
repression, as survivors, as political activists, and as perpetrators of violence.125 Further, 
this focus is said to obscure men’s victimhood and reinforce harmful binaries between 
women (as passive and peaceful victims) and men (as having a natural proclivity for 
conflict and violence).126  
Perhaps because of this commitment to the resolution’s normative value, 
transnational activists were substantially more concerned than local activists by the 
narrowing of the normative agenda from women’s participation and the root causes of 
conflict, to the focus on conflict-related sexual violence. (The concern simply did not 
emerge in the local interviews.) Transnational activists felt that this new focus on sexual 
violence had the potential to be ‘a distraction’,127 or negative because of its focus on 
women as victims. There was particular concern that the UK’s Preventing Sexual 
Violence Initiative, not just because of its narrow focus but because it was adopted 
entirely outside of the government’s existing National Action Plan on Resolution 1325, 
could place the resolution ‘under threat’.128 Activists at the local level will focus on 
articulating their own interpretation of the WPS resolutions. Possible manipulation at the 
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Security Council level does not enter the local calculus of efficacy and strategic planning 
around Resolution 1325.  
In the pendulum swing of WPS resolutions from women’s agency to victimhood, 
the more positive construction of female agency in Security Council Resolutions 2122 
(2013) and 2242 (2015) might justly be celebrated. Nevertheless, the larger question of 
state capture persists and has become more acute with the exclusive role of states in 
developing the latter resolution. Moreover, the historical connection of the WPS 
resolutions to transnational women’s advocacy means that states can continue to enjoy 
residual legitimacy through the adoption and support of further resolutions. Slippage in 
both the ownership and substance of norms being adopted presents a persuasive argument 
for reconsidering the resolutions as the key line of feminist engagement with the Security 
Council. Further, it brings considerations of the political significance of the resolutions to 
the fore.   
5. International Law as Politics: Feminists Seeking Leverage 
A. Discord in International Law-Making 
Gender equality laws and norms in international law are not uniformly endorsed. Those 
who view international law as pre-eminently a site of international power politics where 
feminists can potentially ‘win’, recognize that the openness of these sites is similarly 
amenable to those who would advance regressive gender norms. The value of 
international law as a site for the advancement of feminist politics is most developed in 
terms of the organizational platform that international law provides for feminists active in 
different jurisdictions, 129  and also in terms of the political resources it can yield in 
bringing international scrutiny to recalcitrant states.130  Whereas the focus of feminist 
advocates in development of international law norms of gender equality is on the power 
of collaborative transnational organizing amongst women, and also the winning of 
                                                 
129 Alvarez et al., 'Feminisms in Latin America: From Bogota to San Bernardo,' 17 Signs 
(1992) 393. 
130 Described as the ‘boomerang pattern’, Keck and Sikkink, supra note 38, at 12-13.  
 35 
support of key states and international institutions, the understanding of international law 
as ‘just politics’ identifies international law as principally a site of conflict.131  
Rather than focusing on a single movement or network, and their efforts to 
advance (generally progressive) norms, Clifford Bob for example focuses instead on ‘the 
clash’ between advocacy networks and their adversaries, who also form networks.132 
Rather than assuming that they have little impact and that civil society speaks with one 
voice against state and corporate destruction, his analysis rests on the premise that 
advocacy in the international space is characterized by conflict. With regard to 
international law: 
To challenge a detested norm’s proclaimed emergence, rivals use submergence 
strategies. They attack purported soft laws, arguing that proponents highlighted 
favourable precedents while ignoring inconvenient ones. More belligerently, they 
invent incompatible norms, using tactics mirroring their foes’; their own 
conference declarations, quasi-judicial rulings,  joint statements, expert 
opinions, and law review articles.133  
For example, scholars have revealed how regressive norm entrepreneurs at the 
international level have been able to exploit these same fora and entry-points to advance 
an agenda antithetical to women’s rights and gender equality. Documentation of the 
‘unholy alliance’ of the Vatican, Muslim states and some conservative Catholic states 
provides a potent example, motivated and buttressed by a Christian right transnational 
social movement organized around ‘globalizing family values’134 against women's rights, 
population policy, and gay and lesbian rights.  
B. Power Politics in the UN Security Council  
Discord and power politics in international law-making operates somewhat differently in 
the case of WPS than in gender social issues such as reproductive or sexual rights. The 
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existence of dispersed network of state and non-state actors arguing against the WPS 
resolutions is difficult to identify. The nature of commitments within the WPS agenda are 
unlikely to provoke a backlash of this nature. Of course, in this tapestry of international 
power politics, civil society organizations and alliances are just one, and arguably less 
important one, of several actors, principal of which is states. The complicity of Security 
Council Resolution 1325 with militarist state politics has been most forcefully articulated 
by Dianne Otto, as she draws attention to the place of ‘thematic resolutions’ such as 
Security Council Resolution 1325 within the broader ‘muscular humanitarianism’ of the 
Security Council and its need to develop a new raison d’etre in the aftermath of the Cold 
War,135 and the consequent danger of 1325 legitimating Security Council militarism. 
Sheri Gibbings gives a powerful example of this dynamic in the reference to Resolution 
1325 in the preamble of Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) on Iraq:  
This can be seen as positive, in that it gives legitimacy to advocates' demand for 
women's rightful inclusion in the reconstruction and nation-building process in 
Iraq. But you could also see it in another way: that 1325 is being used as a tool to 
justify military occupation on behalf of "liberating" women. 
There are also fundamental questions about whether, by seeking to assert the 
binding legal status of Security Council Resolution 1325 and to advocate further WPS 
resolutions, feminists should be advocating a greater role for the UN Security Council in 
international law-making. Boyle and Chinkin raise concerns about the Security Council’s 
development of legislative and quasi-legislative functions, based on accountability, 
participation, procedural fairness and transparency of decision-making.136 They note that 
the Security Council is not a representative body and, as a result, its legislative action can 
lack legitimacy and acceptability to non-members.137 Procedurally, its negotiations are in 
private, involving Security Council member states only.138 The power that this gives the 
Security Council, in particular the permanent members, violates the principle of 
                                                 
135 Otto, supra note 7. 
136 Boyle and Chinkin, supra note 41, at 114-115, 229-232. 
137 Ibid., at 114. 
138 Ibid. 
 37 
sovereign equality of states and the principal that states must consent to new obligations 
under international law.139 There is no real scope for challenging or judicially reviewing 
the Security Council’s decisions.140  
Permanent members of the Security Council can veto any resolution that affects 
its interests or those of its allies, resulting in grave inconsistency in the operation of the 
Council. These concerns and flaws in Security Council law-making are particularly 
worrying to states in the global south, whose interests are represented in the Council by 
only a handful of non-permanent members. 
The Security Council is a seriously deficient vehicle for the exercise of legislative 
competence. Dominated by the permanent members, or sometimes by only one or 
two of them, unrepresentative and undemocratic, its quasi-legislative powers can 
only be justified by reference to the paramount urgency and importance of its 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security… [T]he 
increasing prominence of the Security Council in the dynamics of international 
law-making marks an important shift of power and influence away from the 
General Assembly.141 
Expansive feminist analysis, concerned with the political implications of the 
empowerment of the Security Council vis-à-vis the UNGA, presents arguably more 
radical and fundamental questions as to whether feminists engaging international law 
should seek and support these resolutions at all. Such work brings one to a substantively 
different analysis than that offered by a principal concern with implementation and 
enforcement of the WPS resolutions. Such concerns did not emerge at all from feminist 
respondents at any level. Tellingly, insiders understood the political resonance of the 
resolution principally in terms of the political momentum: ‘While you’re working in the 
UN, there’s political momentum that you need to address.’142  
C. Underpinning Feminist Alliances 
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The understanding of international law as the site and outcome of global power politics, 
and international law as a potential site for the advancement of feminist politics, includes 
also the effective leveraging of international law by local activists to secure the actual 
inclusion of women in peacebuilding. Local activists therefore operated with a very 
different understanding of the power politics engendered by the resolution. For local 
activists, the key resonance of the resolution was clearly political: firstly, in underpinning 
new alliances between feminist and more traditional human rights and past-focused 
NGOs in Northern Ireland; secondly, in unlocking political and material resources to 
grassroots women’s organizations; and thirdly, in providing a foothold to challenge the 
traditional power politics dominant in dealing with the past, for example in underpinning 
women’s sector demands for the presence of women in talks aimed at securing agreement 
over loyalist rioting.143  
The most important demonstrated value of the resolution as a political tool in 
Northern Ireland appeared to be underpinning improved local cooperation on questions of 
women and dealing with the past. Local women’s organizations, who had traditionally 
eschewed advocacy on past-focused accountability, due to its potentially divisive nature 
amongst women,144 were more proactively engaging the issue under their Resolution 
1325 activity. 145  Likewise, certain past-focused NGOs reported increased policy and 
programmatic activity on gender, due to the integration of the resolution into their work. 
For example, Relatives for Justice reported how the adoption of the resolution in its own 
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work had led to ‘monitoring and evaluation of all family support and legal casework, to 
identify gender-specific issues and to design responses in the context of 1325’.146 
The political value of the resolution invoked by local respondents was the 
resolution’s value in circumventing the local legislative Assembly and finding allies in 
the supra-national arena. According to local respondents, the resolution allowed them to 
find allies abroad (for example, the CEDAW Committee’s articulation the significance of 
the resolution to Northern Ireland and the impact of the conflict on women). Their 
responses also suggested hints of a ‘boomerang pattern’,147 as they noted the value of 
being able to reference an international standard and international benchmark in winning 
round local civil servants to certain policy positions. 
In terms of its political value, the resolution was repeatedly invoked by local 
respondents for its power to unlock resources to feminist and women’s organizations. 
The objective for all organizations in their engagement with the resolution was that it 
would be helpful in getting resources (material and political) to local grassroots women, 
in particular for the issues that they defined as most important in terms of the resolution 
in Northern Ireland. Indeed, one local respondent not intimately familiar with the text of 
the resolution, when asked about the significance of the resolution to her work, wondered 
aloud ‘Did I use it in a funding application?’148 This priority points again to the very 
specific understanding of activists at local level of the resolution as a vehicle for 
empowerment and articulation of a self-defined feminist agenda in conflict and peace-
making.  
For transnational activists also, the political power of the resolution in 
underpinning alliances between diverse organizations was underlined. The GAPS 
initiative is paradigmatic of such an alliance: it includes human rights, development and 
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peacebuilding perspectives, all in the pursuit of the improved implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 1325 by the UK government. Their very direct and specific policy 
focus on UK implementation of the resolution, combined with their unique combination 
of expertise, had led to GAPS becoming the  ‘go-to’ organization of the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office on all questions of gender and foreign policy.149 By contrast, the 
question of alliances did not appear in feminist insider responses. Rather, insider 
responses tended to associate the resolution more with conflict and international 
competition for resources within the international system.  
To the extent that feminism is politics, one could argue that all feminist 
engagements with international law are inherently political. Nevertheless, the findings in 
this section point to specific opportunities and risks, such as geo-politics and political 
alliances, that are usefully conceptualized as distinct from engagements that draw on 
international law’s doctrinal or normative dimensions.  
6. Conclusion  
The enduring appeal of international law is evidenced by the depth, breadth and 
persistence of feminist engagement. There is little to suggest that, either historically or in 
contemporary times, this activism has proceeded without reservation. In one sense, 
feminist ambivalence about international law as either inadequate to the task of securing 
gender equality or, more nefariously, as actively complicit in the maintenance of gender 
inequality, resonates compellingly with longer-term feminist concerns about engagement 
with domestic law. In another sense, however, it does appear that international law offers 
unique sites of opportunity and risk to those who seek to utilize it in the advancement of 
feminist objectives.  
Through a review of related scholarship and advocacy, the risks identified 
principally concerned the weak nature of gender equality norms emerging in 
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contemporary international law; the vulnerability of these norms to capture by militaristic 
state interests; and the dangers of privileging the Security Council as an organ of 
international law-making. The opportunities, conversely, emerge from international law’s 
supra-national monitoring and enforcement bodies over state behaviour; the relative 
openness of international law-making to articulating certain feminist values, in ways that 
arguably have scant domestic parallel; and the potential of international law to underpin 
local alliances across organizations and issues. 
Broadly speaking, the article found that it was insider feminists who shared 
concerns about the resolution’s legal deficiencies and the broader place of the Security 
Council within international lawmaking that is prominent in the academic literature. 
These concerns were, however, largely remote for local feminist activists, who 
recognized in the resolution important political resources to support their mobilization, 
their alliances with others and, it was hoped, ultimately their engagement with certain 
state actors. The article concludes that critical reflection on feminist strategy in 
international law is usefully informed by more deliberate consideration of its legal, 
political and normative dimensions, as well as an awareness that these dimensions will be 
differently weighted by differently situated feminist actors. By elucidating the different 
rationales for feminist engagement, and also in cautioning differently-situated feminist 
actors as to the potential costs elsewhere of their advocacy, such analysis may ultimately 
inform more constructive engagement across these differences.  
 
 
